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"Ex Africa Semper Aliquid Novi!"'
I. INTRODUCTION
For an initiative that is barely three years old, there is a surprisingly
rich literature on the New Partnership for Africa's Development
(NEPAD). Indeed, in spite of the fact that Africa has produced her share
of intellectually stimulating homegrown development paradigms, none
in the recent past matches the enthusiasm that NEPAD has generated.
NEPAD has become the most captivating of these numerous ideas, and
perhaps the most promising in terms of strategy and potential to improve
Africa's economic condition. In part, this owes to the deeply intellectual
yet pragmatic approach underpinning it's founding, having drawn inspiration
from the idea of an "African renaissance.' 2 It also owes its acceptability
to the "partnership" concept, making the agreement seem more like the
result of an agreeable bargaining process intended to mutually benefit
both parties involved.
Some scholars, such as Professor S.K.B. Asante, emphasize the
indisputable reality that it is a "partnership of unequal partners, 3 while
1. The phrase "Ex Africa Semper Aliquid Novi!" meaning "Something new
always comes out of Africa" is attributed to Pliny the Elder, a senator and army
commander in ancient Rome who died in 79 A.D. See generally JOHN READER, AFRICA:
A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONTINENT (1997).
2. See THABO MBEKI, AFRICA: THE TIME HAS COME (1998). The idea of an
"African renaissance" was popularized most visibly by Thabo Mbeki, particularly in
speeches as Deputy President of South Africa (For instance, Mbeki writes as follows, in
a speech to the Corporate Council on Africa in Chantilly, Virginia, April 19-22, 1997:
"Those who have eyes to see let them see. The African renaissance is upon us. As we
peer through the looking glass darkly, this may not be obvious. But it is upon us." Id. at
201.) After Mbeki, the idea has taken off, with numerous discussion sessions being held
across the continent, and the founding of the African Renaissance Institute. See Mbulelo
Vizikhungo Mzamane, Where there is no Vision the People Perish: Reflections on the
African Renaissance, at http://www. africavenir.org/fulltext/fulltext0l.html (visited on
Sept. 2, 2003). Probably, the earliest available writing on the idea of an African
renaissance was in an essay by Dr. Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, entitled The Regeneration of
Africa, which he authored and presented as an undergraduate student at Columbia
University in 1906. Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, The Regeneration of Africa, in THE
AFRICAN ABROAD (Apr. 5, 1906), available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/
early/regeneration.htm (visited on Sept. 2, 2003). Using the phrase "regeneration" in the
place of the now more popular "renaissance" Seme captured the spirit of re-birth in the
following words: "By this term regeneration I wish to be understood to mean the
entrance into a new life, embracing the diverse phases of a higher, complex existence...
The regeneration of Africa means that a new and unique civilization is soon to be added
to the world. The African is not a proletarian in the world of science and art. He has
precious creations of his own, of ivory, of copper and of gold, fine, plated willow-ware
and weapons of superior workmanship. . .. The most essential departure of this new
civilization is that it shall be thoroughly spiritual and humanistic-- indeed a regeneration
moral and eternal!"
3. See S.K.B Asante, A Partnership of Unequal Partners, 419 NEw AFRICAN 14
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Professor Yash Tandon with tongue-in-cheek has described it as the
"latest effort to 'do something for Africa,"' 4 perhaps seeking to draw
attention to Africa as a nalve and passive recipient of an initiative born
of the magnanimity, or other ulterior interests, of the developed world.
In basic terms, NEPAD is an undertaking by African leaders to eradicate
poverty and spur sustainable economic development by participating
actively in the world economy. It is a "new framework of interaction
with [the] rest of world," 5 and one that is "based on Africans setting their
own agenda,"6 "a long-term vision of an African-owned and African-led
development programme."7 It takes the deliberate strategy of promoting
Africa as a favorable destination for foreign direct investment through
initiatives on good governance and fiscal responsibility.
The NEPAD idea springs from the understanding that international
trade and investment are important engines for growth, and increasingly
will play a major role in any meaningful effort that seeks to bring about
faster development in Africa. International trade has been demonstrably
linked to greater market access opportunities, more foreign exchange,
more foreign direct investment, transfer of technology, and the boosting
of domestic productivity.8 All these are ingredients in positive development.
However, whereas NEPAD is seemingly attractive and workable, and
has a groundswell of support from foreign governments and international
organizations, 9 it has come under intense criticism in its short life span.
Like any initiative or idea, NEPAD itself and its implementation, has
(June 2003).
4. Yash Tandon, NEPAD and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIS): Symmetries
and Contradictions, Paper presented at the African Scholars' Forum on the New
Partnership for African Development, (April 26-29, 2002).




7. Id. at para. 60.
8. See The Doha Round and African Development: Turning Words into Deeds,
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, ECA Position Papers, at 1 (Sept. 2003).
9. See United Nations Declaration on the New Partnership for Africa's
Development, G.A. Res. 57/2, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/2
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.dfa.gov.za (the resolution commits UN member
countries to meeting the peculiar needs of Africa and affirms that international support
for the implementation of NEPAD is essential. It also urges the UN system and the
international community, in particular donor countries, to assist with the implementation
of NEPAD). One would hope that all the interest is indeed genuine and not simply a
search for relevance by these organizations.
been subject to the rigor of debate. 0 One might even add that, the very
fact that it is being criticized by many is testimony to the resonance of
the idea, and its immense potential. To avoid institutional inertia, it
might in fact be safer to ignore some of the criticism, particularly that
born of a lack of understanding of the exact dimensions of Africa's
immense development imperative. However, suggestions to hinge onto
NEPAD a mandate it does not have should be countered, as implementing
them would make it unwieldy. Some of the criticism that could be
ignored is that which springs from the 'ideology of the oppressed'. This
category would include certain sections of the civil society movement,
who see and describe NEPAD as furthering the "global apartheid"'1
system, as a "top-down imposed blue-print,"' 12 as a "continuation of the
policies that got Africa into trouble in the first place"' 3 and as "an
attempt to reverse the failed neo-liberal experiences of the 1980s and
1990s.' 14 In general therefore, while some of these criticisms are genuine,
and deserving of rebuttal, most of it could be attributed to an indignant
refusal to acknowledge that the idea is a promising one. These criticisms
are in part also due to the fact that NEPAD is taking shape at a time
when the civil society movement in Africa is coming into its own. After
decades of repressive regimes when dissent from government policy was
not tolerated, many governments now have reasonably come to respect
basic freedoms, hence the mushrooming of vocal grass-roots civil
society organizations that demand to be consulted for input in the
evolution of government policy. This is certainly a positive social and
political development in the continent as constructive dissent should
under no circumstances be stifled.
This short paper, wishes to add a more fundamental dimension to
these criticisms. Firstly, NEPAD lacks a necessary dosage of legal and
institutional grounding for an outfit that intends to fulfill the kind of
development mandate that it has. We take the view that it was a mistake
to place NEPAD under the unwieldy umbrella of the African Union, and
one that has and will inevitably lead to institutional and legal
10. See Lucy Harraway, Development-Africa: 'Partnership' Called a Ruse by the
Elites, GLOBAL INFO. NETWORK, May 29, 2003. See also Nsongurua J. Udombana, A
Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music of Integration in the African Union Treaty and the
New Partnership for Africa's Development, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 185 (2002)
(examining economic and political integration in Africa in the context of the African
Union Treaty and NEPAD).
11. Harraway, supra note 10 (quoting Patrick Bond of the University of
Witwatersrand).
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting Ravi Naidoo, director of NALEDI).
14. Id. (quoting Masimba Manyanya, former chief economist in the Zimbabwean
Ministry of Finance).
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incoherence. 15 NEPAD can only achieve the mandate originally envisaged
for it if it has the independent institutional and legal capacity to
formulate decisions, identify priorities and implement them, without the
unnecessary strictures of a cumbersome institution such as the AU. It
would still have been easy and welcome, to identify synergies with the
African Union, and to collaborate as independent separately-mandated
African inter-governmental institutions. In this way, NEPAD could
avoid being bogged down by the decision-making inefficiencies of the
African Union.
Secondly, no serious attempt has been made to identify the exact
confluence between NEPAD, and the structured programmatic continent-
wide regional integration efforts as spelt out in the 1980 Lagos Plan of
Action, the Final Act of Lagos, the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African
Economic Community and the Constitutive Act of the African Union16
adopted in July of 2000. In our view, the necessity of dealing with how
exactly NEPAD fits into the scheme of continental economic and
political integration, and whether it fosters or hinders, or whether it is
itself hindered, by the already existing integration schemes, was
conveniently swept under the rug, by a rather hurried declaration that it
is "an arm, a baby," of the African Union. Yet, NEPAD seems to have a
momentum of its own, a pseudo-independence that is bound to bring
institutional and legal tensions to the fore in the not too distant future.
Granted, regional integration initiatives in Africa are in a terrible state of
confusion. Putting aside the WTO-legality of such initiatives, the economic
and political realities seem to have been largely ignored. NEPAD just
complicates matters all the more. NEPAD cannot implement WTO
agreements. It cannot negotiate market access concessions, that being
15. It seems settled now that NEPAD is "the socio-economic development
program of the African Union." See Preamble to the Declaration on the Implementation
of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), AU Doc. Assembly/AU/
Decl.8(II), African Union Assembly, Second Ordinary Session, 10-12 July 2003,
Maputo, Mozambique, available at www.african-union.org/Officialdocuments/
DecisionsDeclarations/offDecisions & Declarations.htm.
16. See Organization of African Unity (OAU), Constitutive Act of the African
Union, July 11, 2000, CABILEG/23.15, 8 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 479 (2000). For analysis of
the Constitutive Act of the African Union, see generally Nsongurua J. Udombana, Can
the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights, 17 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 1177 (2002) (assessing the AU Treaty's prospect of bringing about a
paradigm shift in the poor human rights practices of African states); see also Nsongurua
J. Udombana, The Institutional Structure of the African Union: A Legal Analysis, 33
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 69 (2002).
the domain of governments of countries that are WTO Members.
However, NEPAD has excited such a positive response that it could be a
useful channel through which capacity building and technical assistance
programs could be sourced and even implemented. A solid secretariat,
with a corps of well-qualified and competent professionals could serve
as the intellectual nerve center for forging continent-wide common
positions on investment promotion and certain aspects of trade policy.
In this, the European Commission, shorn of political overtones, could be
a useful model.
Thirdly, NEPAD has tremendous capacity to significantly increase the
level of foreign direct investment inflows into Africa. The goodwill it
has generated, if all of it is indeed genuine, could be an indication of
really positive things to come. However, in excessively emotionalizing
the debate, 17 and making it a mega-project under the AU, African leaders
muted what was really the spark in the entire initiative, that is, its
capacity to gallop into the future by capitalizing on the goodwill of
donor-nations, and re-channeled domestic resources. It should be
recognized however that NEPAD, like most other development models
proposed by Africans or for Africa, has the achilles heel of excessive
external dependence. Planning on how to share out resources that one
does not generate or have control over could be unwise and problematic.
That said, NEPAD's capacity to attract foreign investment, from
whatever source, should be welcomed. The urgent thing is to go back to
the drawing boards and reformulate a strategy that can ensure rational,
efficient and fast decision-making and project implementation. NEPAD
has to have the mandate to allocate resources based on effective and
sound development policies. It has to have a strong legal and institutional
structure. It has to be extricated from the African Union, and for it to be
acceptable as an independent credible inter-governmental investment
promotion strategy, it will have to be regionally balanced and shun any
indication of control by any single particular country. However, diplomatic
savvy will require that economically powerful countries that of necessity
have vested economic and political interests, be recognized but tamed
and managed in a constructive way. Such interests could in fact be made
to work for the common good of collaborating nations as the example of
pragmatic cooperation between the leadership in South Africa and
Mozambique seems to show. South Africa's leadership role in Africa,
both as the strongest economy and as one of the principal architects of
the NEPAD idea, should be acknowledged.
17. See Mbeki: African Union is the Mother, NEPAD is her Baby (Letter from
South African President, Thabo Mbeki, to Prime Minister Jean Chr~tien of Canada), 415
NEWAFRICAN 44 (Feb. 2003).
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In ensuring the workability of NEPAD therefore, it will have to be
imbued with a legal and institutional life of its own. Without this, it will
most certainly turn out to be another gallant effort by Africans to
improve their lot that simply didn't work because a dispassionate and
sound foundation wasn't laid when it should have been. And, afortiori,
NEPAD's mandate will have to be clearly delimited and its internal
organizational structures rationalized. It should not be saddled with too
wide a mandate. The desirable thing for instance, would be to put in its
charge only the trim docket of investment, with the necessary corollary
being trade related aspects of investment. Whereas it is acknowledged
that development issues are interlinked in such a way that it is not easy
to delineate them in this manner, effort should be made not to overload
and in the process overwhelm the effectiveness of the NEPAD process
and secretariat by an over-expansive development plan. As is wont to
happen, some otherwise inept governments may also shift blame for
their inadequate development efforts to a failure in NEPAD, if it assumes
a mandate so broad as to supplant individual national initiatives. Already,
the President of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, has been quoted issuing a
ringing indictment of NEPAD as a failure.1
8
This paper is divided into five parts. Part I introduces NEPAD, its
philosophical basis and objectives. Part II discusses the investment
18. The Gambian president is quoted to have said that NEPAD was a charter for
beggars that Africa does not need. He said: "NEPAD would not work... Africa is the
richest continent in terms of mineral resources, but because of ignorance, Africa in
economic terms is the poorest continent and we Africans are the laughing stock of
humanity. We have failed because some of us are agents of the same people we are
supposed to fight against. We produce the bulk of the world's raw materials so why are
we still poor? Some of us are fighting proxy wars in Africa for the benefit of others.
Africa has never colonized anyone. Some people who prolonged apartheid are now
waving the flag of democracy and freedom. The African debt is not globalized, it is
Africanized... I Yahya Jammeh will not kneel down before any man and beg. I will only
kneel down before God. Yes. People are sick and tired of African beggars. Africa does
not need charity, Africa does not need ESAP and NEPAD. Africa needs liberty and
independence." See NEPAD Will Never Work, available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories.
For concerns on the quality of President Jammeh's leadership and development in the
Gambia see The Inability to Govern (Part One), in THE INDEPENDENT (THE GAMBIA)-
AAGM, Aug. 29, 2003, available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/2003O8390.html.
The article, inter alia, states that President Jammeh "has failed to tackle hyperinflation,
coupled with mass stagnation in production and other economic activities, he has shown
that he does not have the political will to put in place measures guarding against the
calamity we all face today. As prices of basic commodities rise (bread, rice, sugar, soft
drinks, transportation etc) the President remains largely unfazed by the major hardships
that Gambians face daily, and instead proceeds to chastise, criticize and threaten the
populace who will determine if he will be employable in 2006...."
promotion role of NEPAD and its difference from past development
thinking about Africa's problems. In Part III we discuss NEPAD's
strategy for realizing investment flows into Africa, some of the
NEPAD's institutional weaknesses, and the repercussions thereof in
realizing the NEPAD objectives. It also highlights the potential
implications of NEPAD to the regional integration plan in Africa.
Taking into account the supposed political clash between NEPAD and
the AU, Part IV discusses possible ways of restructuring NEPAD to
enable it to function better as an investment promotion strategy and Part
V concludes.
II. INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: NEPAD AND THE AFRICAN
POLITICAL PROCESSES
The marginalization of Africa and the fact that the continent has not
witnessed any significant benefits from the rapid globalization and
liberalization in the world needs no further elaboration. It is also a fact
that African countries have made valiant efforts to try and improve their
lot through numerous initiatives in the past though none has ever really
been successful. In the past two decades alone, there have been at least
five such efforts, that is: the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic
Development of Africa, 1980-2000, and the Final Act of Lagos of April
1980; Africa's Priority Programme of Economic Recovery 1986-1990,
later remodeled with assistance from the United Nations into the United
Nations Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and
Development of 1986; the African Alternative Framework to Structural
Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation
of 1989; the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development
of 1990; and the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of
Africa in the 1990s, of 1991.
The birth of NEPAD on October 23, 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria, was the
culmination of a long process of consolidation of "new vision"
development and African revival thinking by Presidents Thabo Mbeki of
South Africa, and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, among others. 19 It also
drew on the Compact for African Development, a document that was
prepared by the Economic Commission for Africa pursuant to a request
by African Finance Ministers in a meeting held in Addis Ababa,
19. The two plans, the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme
by Presidents Mbeki, Bouteflika of Algeria and Mubarak of Egypt, and the Omega Plan
for Africa by Wade were initially merged into the New Africa Initiative, which was
subsequently, renamed NEPAD. See also I. Taylor & P. Nel, 'New Africa', Globalization
and the Confines of the Elite Reformist: 'Getting the Rhetoric Right', Getting the
Strategy Wrong, 23 THIRD WLD. Q. 163 (2002).
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Ethiopia, in November 2000. The Implementation Committee of Heads
of States, which is chaired by President Obasanjo of Nigeria, adopted the
revised NEPAD Document "embodying the philosophy, priorities and
implementation modalities of the initiative."2  The NEPAD document
opens with three introductory paragraphs basically explaining Africa's
position in the world and the new political commitment by African
leaders to democracy and development. It then goes into setting the
strategy for the attainment of the objectives, an elaboration of the
programs of action and an implementation plan. The NEPAD idea is
novel and different from past African development thinking in certain
ways, the first being the fact that it is, developed, owned and managed
by Africans. In keeping with the idea of an African renaissance, which
has its roots in a uniquely African perception and intellectualization of
global issues, the document rules out the idea that the continent is
intellectually deprived.21  Secondly, NEPAD rests on a new kind of
relationship between Africa and the development partners. This
relationship, unlike in the past, is described as a "partnership" based on
mutual obligations, commitments, interests and benefits. It recognizes
that the so-called development partners also benefit, in fact very
profitably, by engaging with Africa. This is not a trivial recognition.
According to a 1999 study by the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO) Africa consistently yields the highest return for
foreign investment compared to all other regions of the world; four times
the return compared to developed countries, double the return from Asia
and two-thirds more than from Latin America.22 It is therefore a positive
confidence-building measure if African countries can recognize that the
donor community and foreign investors need their vast markets,
immense resources and affordable labor costs, as much as they
themselves need the economic benefits of massive foreign investment
injections.
The third and most brilliant way in which NEPAD is different from
past thinking is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 23 a
20. See The New Partnership for Africa's Development.
21. The NEPAD architects were cognizant that "the true genius of a people is
measured by its capacity for bold and imaginative thinking, and a determination in
support of their development." See NEPAD, supra note 5, at para. 57.
22. UNIDO Report, November 1999. See also Kul Bhushan, Africa: Last Great
Investment Frontier, NEWAFRICAN, Nov. 1999, at 32.
23. For an incisive commentary on the APRM, see Jakkie Cilliers, From
Government to Civil Society Review: An Update on the NEPAD Peer Review Process
"systematic assessment of the performance of a country by other states
or peers. 24 The goal of the APRM process is to help the country under
review to improve policy-making, adopt best practices and comply with
generally accepted standards and commitments, principles and codes of
conduct. Whereas however, Africa has instituted the peer review process as
an innovative compliance self-assessment mechanism, the document
does not spell out the need for or the mechanism for a similar
arrangement for the development partners. Finally, NEPAD is also
different in the sense that it recognizes and takes into account the
diversity and variations in development levels in the continent, an
obvious indictment to the "one-size-fits-all" approach of past initiatives.
In this regard, it places premium on regional cooperation and integration.
The expected results from a full implementation of NEPAD are: high
and sustainable continent-wide economic growth; reduction in poverty
and inequality; diversified productive capacities enhanced international
competitiveness and increased exports; and a more cohesive continent
through integration. The NEPAD idea is "anchored on the determination of
Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of
under-development and exclusion in a globalizing world., 25  In the
document, the leaders recognize that African resources should be
"harnessed to create wealth for the well-being of her peoples." 26
Further, in "doing so, the challenge is for the peoples and governments
of Africa to understand that development is a process of empowerment
and self-reliance. Accordingly, Africans must not be wards of benevolent
guardians; rather they must be the architects of their own sustained
upliftment., 27 The NEPAD document lays blame for Africa's dismal
development record on "a variety of reasons," both internal and external,
including "questionable leadership ' 28 and a lack of "ownership by Africans
themselves" of the recommended development strategies. 29 Rather
diplomatically, it also points out that the Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAPs) of the 1980s "provided only a partial solution"3° to the
development crisis in Africa because "they promoted reforms that
and Structures, Institute of Security Studies (Mar. 2003).
24. See What NEPAD Implies for African Policy Makers, U.N. Economic
Commission for Africa, 35th Sess., at 18, U.N Doc. E/ECA/CM.1/2 (2002) (Paper
distributed at the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Committee of Experts of the Conference
of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Johannesburg,
South Africa, October 16-18, 2002).
25. See NEPAD, supra note 5, at para. 1.
26. Id. at para. 20.
27. Id. at para. 27.
28. Id. at para. 42.
29. Id.
30. See NEPAD, supra note 5, at para. 24.
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tended to remove serious price distortions, but gave inadequate attention
to the provision of social services."31  In truth, studies have been
conducted that show that Africa is indeed worse off at the moment than
it was prior to the SAPs.32 On the point of "questionable leadership," it
is hoped the "new" crop of leaders in the continent will change the way
things have been done in the past. It states: "Significantly, the numbers
of democratically elected leaders are on the increase. Through their
actions, they have declared that the hopes of Africa's peoples for a better
life can no longer rest on the magnanimity of others. 33 This aspiration
would seem like a contradiction given that the subsequent recommendations
in the action plan that lays emphasis on debt-relief and foreign investment.
NEPAD recognizes the potential and benefits of globalization. At
paragraph 32, the document states that globalization has resulted in
"opportunities for lifting millions of people out of poverty' '34 except that
Africa has not reaped these benefits due to lack of capacity "to compete
effectively 35 and "the absence of fair and just global rules 36 through
which the strong have been able to "advance their interests to the
detriment of the weak, especially in the areas of trade, finance and
technology. 37 Quite importantly for the kind of remedial action plan
that the NEPAD architects map out later in the document, it is stated that
31. Id.
32. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(2002). See also Economic Development in Africa: From Adjustment to Poverty
Reduction, What is New?, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2, (Sept. 2002) (Which traces the history of force-fed
economic "experiments" in Africa from Import Substitution to the most recent one which
is implemented through the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.
According to the report, this latest strategy, is supposed to ensure the participation of
broader society in the economic policy formulation process, ostensibly because
developing country governments cannot be trusted any longer with the ability to come up
with policies that work. The paper states PRSPs are the main documents defining the
strategies to be pursued and are prepared by national authorities in developing countries
with broad-based participation of civil society organizations, stakeholders in enterprises
and the poor. The Enhanced Structural Facility (ESAF) of the IMF has been replaced by
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), and the PRSPs have become an integral
component of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative and a precondition
for access to the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) introduced by the World
Bank in 2001. As a result, bilateral grants, concessionary loans and debt relief have all
become inexorably linked to poverty reduction policies and strategies.").
33. See NEPAD, supra note 5, at para. 44.
34. Id. at para. 32.
35. Id. at para. 33.
36. Id.
37. Id.
additional reasons for Africa's inability to take advantage of globalisation
include "structural impediments," "resource outflows and unfavourable
terms of trade." 38 NEPAD is emphatic that for Africa to lay stake to its
"rightful place in the world" a lot rests on its ability to build "a strong
and competitive economy as the world moves towards greater liberalisation
and competition. 39 In effect, the document is clear that the objective of
a strong and competitive African economy and a developed continent
should be realized by riding the wave of globalization when it states:
"while globalisation has increased the cost of Africa's ability to
compete, we hold that the advantages of an effectively managed
integration present the best prospects for future economic prosperity and
poverty reduction. 4 ° It exhorts Africa to be a part of "this new economic
revolution.'
The challenge of course remains as large and momentous as it has
always been; perhaps worse in the sense that there is no other paradigmatic
development option for poor countries at the moment other than to
participate vigorously in the globalization process. In this way, there is a
vague chance that Africa's priorities could be taken into account at the
global negotiating table, and hence solutions demanded. We describe
this chance as vague because recent experience has been that African
demands are callously ignored. In the recently concluded World Trade
Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico, a
group of West African countries tabled a proposal for the reduction of
cotton subsidies by developed countries which, as they justifiably
claimed, were distorting world prices and thereby hurting poor cotton
farmers in West Africa. 2 Their case was very compelling and simple.
The representative of Mali, speaking at one of the plenary sessions
during the conference outlined a plan for the "elimination of distortive
measures coupled with a transitional compensation mechanism under
which subsidizers would pay affected least-developed countries to avoid
the further deterioration of their cotton industry., 43  It generated
38. See id. at para. 34. Quite unfortunately, the NEPAD architects shied away from
stating how the unfair global rules could be reformed and how the continent could
overcome the other structural impediments or in fact how the adverse terms of trade
could be improved. In this regard see id. at para. 41, which states: "We hold that it is
within the capacity of the international community to create fair and just conditions."
39. Id. at para. 50.
40. Id. at para. 28.
41. Id.
42. For a detailed analysis of the impact of developed country cotton sector
subsidies on poor developing world farmers see Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of US
Cotton Subsidies on Africa, Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 30.
43. See Cotton-The 'Trips and Health' of Cancun?, in BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE
ON THE FIFTH WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (Sept. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.ictsd.org.
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immense attention and became the litmus test on how development
oriented the WTO's Doha development Round of negotiations really is.
According to an Argentinean negotiator quoted during the Cancun
ministerial, adopting a positive decision on the cotton issue would have
amounted to the "kick-off point for the 'development round." '44 Sadly,
these demands were dismissed by the recalcitrance of the United States,
which urged these countries to instead "diversify away from cotton" and
into "the production of textiles which could then be granted preferential
market access in the US via the African Growth and Opportunity Act.'45
This recommendation was nothing short of insolent in the manner in
which it skirted the actual issue of cotton subsidies, the cause of the
unsustainably low world cotton prices, and particularly in full knowledge of
the fundamental structural problems that exist in Africa. According to
the US, what was needed was a "comprehensive approach" to the issue
pointing out the "factors beyond subsidies that cause cotton prices to fall
such as general economic downturn, competition from artificial fibers
and increased harvests due to good weather. 4 6 In sum, nothing came of
the demands for the reduction or complete elimination of cotton
subsidies, a result which contributed in no small part to the collapse of
the ministerial conference as a whole.
III. LEGAL ISSUES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEPAD's
AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT PROMOTION STRATEGY
In order to make a break with its dismal past and be on course in the
"new long-term vision' 47 of development, the continent will need "massive
and heavy investment. 48 One of the most vexing questions posed by
NEPAD critics rests precisely on this assertion on the need for massive
investment injections into the continent. Where exactly will the investments
come from? Or to put it plainly, where will the money for realizing the
NEPAD vision come from? This question demands a precise answer
because, as Professor Yash Tandon rather candidly stated in a paper
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Ambassador Josette Sheeran Shiner, Remarks on African Cotton Initiative
(Sept. 10, 2003), at http://www.ustrade-wto.gov/tr091 lshiner.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2004) (also on file with the author). See also Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO
Ministerial Conference, supra note 43.
47. NEPAD, supra note 5, at para. 66.
48. Id.
presented to a conference of African Scholars last year, "no amount of
dreaming about new visions, or about a new kind of leadership in Africa,
will amount to much unless ways are found to finance the vision. 49
According to the NEPAD document, "Africa needs to fill an annual
resource gap of 12 per cent of its GDP, or US $ 64 billion. This will
require increased domestic savings, as well as improvements in the public
revenue collection systems. However, the bulk of needed resources will
have to be obtained from outside the continent., 50 Other scholars have
differed with the "resource-gap" argument, in effect saying that Africa
does not need any external injections of resources to develop.
According to Yash Tandon, the argument that Africa has a resource gap
that needs to be topped up by external financial flows is based on
"spurious data"'5 and may actually be an incorrect conclusion. He states:
It is interesting to understand how NEPAD, or to be more correct, the
economists who produced the document, came to the conclusion that there is a
"resource gap" in the monetary sense in Africa. It is based on a quite simple
mathematical logic, which may or may not have an empirical basis. It starts
with a development goal, or rather, a "goal" in terms of projected increase in the
GNP, which is not the same as development goal. In NEPAD this is stated as
7% growth rate per year for Africa up to 2015 in order to meet the millennium
objectives. Then based on spurious data and the questionable concept of
saving... the economists give a figure of say 2% or 3% as Africa's saving rate.
It then follows, logically, arithmetically, that the balance has to come from
outside. Hence, it is argued, the need for capital inflows, or FDIs. The logic is
so simple that anybody who questions it would by definition, be either a lunatic
or simply stupid. 2
Whether or not Africa does indeed have a resource gap, and its
method of calculation would seem like an intellectual argument. The
fact is that almost all African countries are angling for foreign
investment. Whether within the NEPAD framework or not, the attraction of
foreign direct investment (FDI) is a top priority for many African
governments. Most of them now see it as their duty to do everything in
their power to create an environment that is conducive to FDI, a tectonic
shift from the prevailing autarchic thinking of the 1970sf 3  The vast
49. Tandon, supra note 4, at para. II(C).
50. NEPAD, supra note 5, at para. 147.
51. Tandon, supra note 4, para. III(B).
52. Id.
53. Professor M. Somarajah notes these changes in strategy in the following terms:
"much of the 1970s was spent by developing States asserting their economic sovereignty
over foreign investments which entered their territory. Doctrines like permanent
sovereignty over natural resources have now become so stabilized that they are regarded
as stating mere truisms. Developing States have now moved away from this rhetorical
stage into the pragmatic stage, where the aim is to attract as much investment as possible
into their territory and ensure that such investment is harnessed to their developmental
objectives." See M. Sornarajah, Protection of Foreign Investment in the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation Region, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 105, 126 (Apr. 1995). In being able
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majority of these countries now welcome foreign investment almost
unreservedly. 4 Consequently, on average there has been an impressive
increase in cross-border flows of FDI in the past two decades.
55
to attract foreign investment, developing countries have to overcome the perception that
they are "unsafe" destinations for foreign capital. In a comprehensive and wide ranging
study conducted the Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) an Indian civil society
organization, it was found, for instance, that "negative perceptions hamper the
implementation of FDI policies. For instance investors may feel insecure about, or lack
confidence in South Africa due to a high crime rate, uncertainty over property rights,
government policies and political violence. There are also spillovers of the Zimbabwe land
crisis, the civil wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo." See Sanchita
Chatterjee, Foreign Direct Investment in developing Countries (CUTS, Investment for
Development Project Reports, Jaipur, India, 2002). Developing countries' quest for a
greater share in global foreign investment flows has spurned much literature in the past
two decades. In particular, there has been a sustained focus on how to manage the risks
associated with the investment. See Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Reducing
Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization
Clauses and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1
(1994). As Abba Kolo notes, "nothing is more important to maintaining the profitability
of international companies than the successful management of exposure to political,
economic, and financial risks." See Abba Kolo, Managing Political Risks in
Transnational Investment Contracts, CEPMLP ONLINE JOURNAL (2000), at http://www.
dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/Vol 1/article 1-4.html (last visited on Jan. 27, 2004).
54. See EDWARD M. GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
97-100 (1996). Several developing countries have in the recent past declared themselves
welcoming of foreign investment. See BBC News, Gambia Woos Foreign Investors (July
4, 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/Ihi/business/2091010.stm; BBC News, South
Africa Targets More Investment (February 25 2002) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
business/I 840165.stm; BBC News, Nigeria Seeks Foreign Investment, (Sept. 24, 2002,
available at http://news.bbc/co/uk/l/hi/business/1561585.stm; David Gardner, India
Liberalizes Inward Investment Regulations, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at 12; William
Wallis, Nigeria Unveils Sell-Off Plans, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2000, at 10; and Victor
Mallet, Mbeki Shifts the Emphasis to Business, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at 7. See also
Laith Al-Qasem, Attracting Foreign Direct Investment as a Means of Developing ICT,
available at http://www.worldbank.org /mdf/mdf4/papers/alqasem.pdf. Al-Qasem notes
that: "FDI has become an important developmental tool for counties. Large trans-
national corporations have billions of dollars to invest in countries, which can provide
needed services and capabilities. Foreign direct investment once attracted is a
substantially more stable form of funding than either development assistance (aid) or
loans. This should lead developing countries to favor foreign direct investment over
other types of capital flows. Additionally, foreign direct investment appears to facilitate a
one for one increase in domestic investment." The importance of FDI in the development
of poor economies has also been recognized in a resolution of the United Nations. In
December 1999 the Second Committee of the U.N. General Assembly approved a draft
resolution calling for the creation of an "enabling environment" for FDI to developing
states. Press Release, U.N., Concluding Work for Fifty-Fourth Session, Second Committee
Approves Texts on Globalization; Financing for Development, U.N. Doc. GAIEF/2907
(Dec. 16, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press.
55. For an early indication of the veracity of this claim see generally EDWARD M.
GRAHAM & PAUL R. DRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (3d
According to UNCTAD in 2001, developed countries were host to about
two thirds of the total global FDI stock and took in over 68 percent of
the total global FDI inflows.56 On the other hand, the FDI flows to
developing countries accounted for the remainder with Africa receiving
2.3 percent of the total and the bulk going to East Asia and Latin
America in absolute terms. 57. FDI inflows into Africa in the aggregate
rose from US$ 9 billion in the year 2000 to more than 19 billion in
200158. Even though the increase is seemingly impressive, in actual fact
FDI for most countries in the region remained more or less as it was in
2000 because the reflected increase was due to a few large merger and
acquisitions FDI projects in South Africa and Morocco. In 2002, Africa
suffered a "dramatic decline in FDI inflows-from US$ 19 billion in
2001 US$ to 11 billion in 2002."59 In general, the flows to 23 out 53
African countries declined. 60 The main characteristics of FDI in Africa
have not changed in any significant way in the last few years.
Historically, a large proportion of FDI was directed at the primary sector,
especially oil and gas, which explains why countries such as Angola,
Algeria, Chad, Nigeria and Tunisia have been high recipients of FDI and
in 2002 accounted for more than half of the total continental inflows.6'
Therefore, besides encouraging governments to mobilize and rationally
use domestic resources, NEPAD's success hinges on its ability to further
re-package the African continent in a manner that makes it attractive for
foreign direct investment (FDI). It is the flow of FDI that will determine
whether the targeted annual growth rate of seven percent 62 will be
attained, and ultimately whether NEPAD will be a success or not.
This imperative of FDI attraction could introduce some tensions. As
many countries are already doing, they will bend-over backwards simply
to attract foreign investment, and in the process give-up some of their
hard-earned sovereignty. It should be recognized however that the
attainment of higher standards of living for all should indeed be the
overriding priority of governments and that beggars have no dignity.
The example of Chad Republic is worth noting here. The discovery of
ed. 1993).
56. See UNCTAD FDI/TNC information database.
57. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev. ("UNCTAD"), World Investment Report 2002,
at 13-14, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2002, U.N. Sales No. E.02.II.D.4 (2002), available
at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2002_en.pdf.
58. Id.
59. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev. ("UNCTAD"), World Investment Report 2003,
at 8-9, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2003, U.N. Sales No. E.03.II.D.8 (2003), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2003-en.pdf.
60. Id. at 9.
61. Id.
62. See The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), supra note 5, at
para. 147.
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oil in Chad has thrust it into the limelight with the novel and rather
interesting contractual provisions for oil exploitation. Under the
proposed agreement, how Chad receives and spends its citizens'
resources will be transparent and subject to scrutiny by the parties to the
contract, the World Bank as the insurer, the United States and a
consortium of oil companies led by Exxon-Mobile. The Miandoum
Oilfield, the main site, is estimated to be worth about US$ 15 billion and
produces about 225,000 barrels per day at maximum production
capacity.63 According to the contract, the World Bank has set up a
system to pay the 12.5 percent royalties due to Chad, into an escrow
account in a bank in London.64 Processed through the account, a portion
of the funds is to be sent to two commercial banks in N'Djamena, the
capital city of Chad, where an oversight committee including religious
leaders will allocate the funds for various development projects, in
accordance with a law passed by the parliament in 1998.65 The contract
also requires that 10% of the revenue is to be injected off the top into an
"international investment trust fund for future generations of Chadians.
At least 77.5% of the balance is also to be spent on education, health,
housing, and rural infrastructure projects. 66 That Chad acquiesced to all
these contractual provisions is testimony to the controlling power of
foreign capital. On its own, Chad would never have been able to pull off
a project as massive as the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and
Pipeline Project, which provided the way to transport the oil from
Chad's southern desert lands through to the Gulf of Guinea on the coast
of Cameroon for onward shipment, mainly to the United States. In return
for the huge investment, and economic benefits, Chad opened itself up to
external controls on how to conduct its spending. To a point, this is not
a bad thing given Chad's inherent incapacities. In an unflattering
document, the World Bank notes that: "at the moment, Chad is so poor
that it cannot afford the bare minimum of public services necessary for a
decent life. The pipeline project will allow Chad to use more resources
to finance expenditures in health, education, infrastructure and rural
development necessary to reduce poverty. 67
63. See Milan Vesely, Chad: The Tip of the Spear, 291 AFRICAN Bus. 36 (Oct. 2003).
64. Id.
65. See The World Bank, Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline
Project: Note on the Use of the Petroleum Bonus, June 2001, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/bonus.pdf. See Vesely, supra note 63.
66. See Vesely, supra note 63.
67. See The World Bank, supra note 65.
It is necessary for African countries to remember however that even as
they welcome foreign investors under the NEPAD framework, they still
retain certain fundamental rights and, that above all, the admission of
foreign investment should be predicated on a demonstrable positive
economic impact. They need to remember that under customary international
law, there is no right of admission or right to invest in a foreign country.
Hence, states retain the power to determine which foreign investors or
investment to allow and in what sectors. 68 Any rights or obligations that
a state may have with respect to foreign investment are born of treaties
and other instruments of international law negotiated by choice with or
amongst other states. Consequently, African states, like all others, retain
the autonomy and ability to regulate such inward foreign investment
flows, a definite affirmation of their sovereignty.69
To go back to the question of where the NEPAD implementation
money will come from, we have seen that NEPAD's answer lies in the
mobilization of domestic resources and the attraction of FDI. On the
point of domestic resource mobilization under NEPAD, already there
has been a documented maiden attempt. On September 18, 2003, the
first ever shipping line owned entirely by private African capital sourced
from over 30 countries across west and central Africa, docked at Apapa
Port in Lagos, Nigeria.7° It had set sail about two weeks earlier from
Dakar, Senegal, flagged off by one of the NEPAD high priests, President
Wade, of Senegal. The launching of the shipping line, Ecomarine
International, was reportedly supported by the NEPAD implementation
Committee and the NEPAD Business Group. In a way, this event
heralded a major break-through because shipping is one of those sectors
in Africa that was almost totally dominated by foreign multinational
corporations. It is also particularly positive because it shows that cross-
border private capital sourcing is doable in Africa.
68. See WTO Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment,
Communication from the European Community and Its Member States: Concept Paper
on Non-discrimination, WT/WGTI/W/122 (June 27, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/trade/issues/sectoral/investment/docs/cp_122.pdf (stating: "Customary international law
does not require any host country to guarantee a non-discriminatory treatment to foreign
investors wishing to establish their activities in its territory or even to those already
established.").
69. According to Professor M. Somarajah, the right of a state to control foreign
direct investment is based on the international regarding aliens and the right of a state to
deny entry to such aliens. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 83 (1994). A.A Fatouros extends the rights of states in this regard to cover
"trade and foreign investors". See A.A Fatouros, Towards an International Agreement
on Foreign Direct Investment? 10 ICSID REVIEW: FOREIGN INV. L.J. 181, 193 (1995).
70. See Victoria Udoh, NEPAD: Economarine Vessel Berths in Lagos Today, in
This Day, NIGERIA NEWS, Sept. 18, 2003, available at www.allafrica.com /stories (last
visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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With regard to attracting foreign investment, NEPAD has set the
project preparatory process in motion by reaching out to various
competent regional and international organizations. In elaborating on this,
we wish to single out investment in the agricultural sector in particular.
Without doubt, agriculture is a crucial sector for Africa, particularly in
view of the fact that most of the continent's population lives in rural
areas. Presently, the sector accounts for some 60 percent of Africa's
employment opportunities and 20 percent of its export earnings. More
than 70 percent of the total population depends on agriculture as a source
of food and basic income. Yet the agriculture sector in Africa has been
in a steady decline over the past two decades. The level of investment
has declined, both domestically in the concerned countries, and in terms
of how much funding is available from multilateral donors. For instance
the World Bank's lending portfolio dropped its credit to agriculture from
39 percent in 1978 to just about seven percent in 2000.71
At the moment, most African countries are not providing any
significant domestic support to their agricultural sector. In fact, many
levy taxes on the sale of agricultural produce. This is a definite farming
disincentive. It should be admitted that for low-income economies,
many of which are single-commodity agricultural producers, this is both
the most reliable source of income for the government, and also the main
exchange and income earner for the country. An imaginative revision of
the tax laws, to remove production-constraining taxes, throughout the
continent could boost farmer-incomes and morale and should be a
necessary corollary to the anticipated agricultural reforms. Such revision
however will have to be done in a manner that does not derogate from
WTO commitments.
The NEPAD document gives prominence to agriculture by stating that
"improvement in agricultural lerformance is a prerequisite of economic
development on the continent." It points out that improving productivity
in the sector would require the removal of a number of structural
constraints including "climatic uncertainty, which raises the risk factor
facing intensive agriculture based on the significant inflow of private
investment., 73 It then goes on to call upon governments to "support the
provision of irrigation equipments and develop arable lands when private
71. The New Partnership for Africa's Development, supra note 5, at para. 134.
72. The New Partnership for Africa's Development, supra note 5, at para. 131.
73. Id. at para. 132.
agents are unwilling to do So." ' 74 Most importantly for our further analysis
here, it requires governments to improve rural infrastructure including
roads and rural electrification grids.7
Efforts to reverse the decline in agriculture in Africa have resulted in
calls for a "green revolution.' '76 The United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), the lead UN agency on agriculture, has taken steps
to offer assistance to African countries in this regard, and a natural ally
was found in the NEPAD initiative. At the 22nd FAO Regional
Conference for Africa held on February 8, 2002, in Cairo, a resolution
outlinin7 the key steps to achieve improvements in the sector was
adopted. As a follow up to this resolution, the participating government
officials also undertook to hold a special NEPAD-focused session of
the FAO Regional Conference for Africa. This was eventually held in
Rome on June 9, 2002,78 and resulted in an endorsement of the NEPAD
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)
document. 79 The process of converting the CAADP into implementable
74. Id.
75. Id. Paragraph 133 requires governments to invest in further promotional
activities with the following words: "The institutional environment for agriculture also
significantly affects the sector's productivity and performance. Institutional support in
the form of research centres and institutes, the provision of extension and support
services, and agricultural trade fairs will further boost the production of marketable
surpluses. The regulatory framework for agriculture must also be taken into account,
including the encouragement of local community leadership in rural areas, and the
involvement of these communities in policy and the provision of services."
76. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General's Address to the Governing Council of the
International Fund for Agricultural Development on its 25th Anniversary, (Feb. 19,
2003), available at www.ifad.org/events/gc/26/speeches/sg.htm. According to Kofi Annan,
"We must address the fact that for them, the rapid march of globalization internationally,
and liberalization domestically, currently creates more risks than opportunities. We need
to work together to help them reach the quality and standards required, and to ensure that
trade policies and intellectual property rights regimes allow poor producers a sustainable
position in the new system. This will require committed efforts in the new trade round
as well as in broader policy discussions. I am happy to see the United Nations working
ever more closely with WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions towards that end. And
it will require us to work towards a green revolution in Africa's agricultural sector, so
that Africa may move towards the self-sufficiency that we have seen achieved elsewhere"
(emphasis added).
77. Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of the African Union A Brief Presentation
of the Process of Converting the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
Programme (CAADP)to Implementable Plans of Action at National and Regional Levels,
Doc. AU/MIN/AGRI/3 (July 1, 2003).
78. At the request of the NEPAD Steering Committee, the Program was prepared
by the NEPAD Secretariat in cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations.
79. See Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Nov. 2003) (published with technical
support from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) [hereinafter
CAADP].
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action plans is already ongoing. 8°
The CAADP seeks to restore agricultural growth, rural development
and food security in the continent. It captures the development priorities
for agricultural recovery in Africa and for contributing to poverty
reduction and economic growth through four main strategies: expansion
of the area under sustainable land management and reliable water controlsystems;81 improvement of rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities
for improved market access;82 enhancement of food supply and reduction
of hunger;83 and the development of agricultural research, technological
dissemination and adoption to sustain long-term productivity growth.
84
As a follow-up to the CAADP document, the African Union Assembly
of Heads of State and Government ratified the Declaration on
Agriculture and Food Security in Africa in July 2003.85 In support of the
process that culminated in the CAADP document, the leaders resolved,
inter alia, to revitalize the agricultural sector
through special policies and strategies targeted at small scale and traditional
farmers in rural areas and the creation of enabling conditions for private sector
participation, with emphasis on human capacity development and the removal
of constraints to agricultural production and marketing, including pil fertility,
poor water management, inadequate infrastructure, pest and diseases.
The leaders also basically adopted the CAADP document as a blueprint
for the efforts needed in the sector and agreed to implement it "at the
national, regional and continental levels.,, 
8 T
To go back once more to the point of sources of funds for NEPAD
projects, it would be worthwhile here to use the model of financing in
the agricultural sector. The CAADP document, calls for investment of
up to US$ 251 billion.88 The preparation and mobilization of these vast
80. See A Brief Presentation of the Process of Converting the Comprehensive
Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) to Implementable Plans of Action
at National and Regional Levels, Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of the African
Union, Maputo, Mozambique, Doc. AU/MIN/AGRII3 (July 1-2, 2003), available at
http://www.fao.org/tc/Tca/rpfs/maputo/maputo3e.htm.
81. See CAADP, supra note 79, at ch. 2.
82. See id., at ch. 3.
83. See id., at ch. 4.
84. See id., at ch. 5.
85. See Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, AU Doc.
Assembly/AU/Decl.7 (II), African Union Assembly, Second Ordinary Session, 10-12
July 2003, Maputo, Mozambique, available at http://www.african-union.org.
86. See id. at para. I.
87. See id. at para. 2.
88. See CAADP, supra note 79, at para. 3.
sums is certainly bound to be a herculean task. In effect, the desirability
of a particular project will determine its ability to attract funding. Hence
the idea of "bankable projects," defined as projects that are attractive to
investors in the sense that they are clear enough for the investors to
determine their worthiness, and that also have the key NEPAD attributes
of being either Africa-led or significantly African-funded. 89 The process
of preparation of "bankable projects," would have to draw from a
number of processes, some of which are already on-going such as the
World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy, particularly for projects that
target World Bank funding. This is both for the sake of domestic policy
coherence at national level and also because as a matter of policy, the
World Bank has indicated that it will no longer support any programmes
that do not fall within a country's PRSP. The NEPAD CAADP
implementation process could therefore be divided loosely into two











U N PH ..................... ,. ........A
FUNDING PHASE
. . R ................................. EV. N P E...... 
.PROJECT DEVELOPMENT PHASE
89. Remarks of Mr. Mafa Chipeta, on Bankable Projects to Revitalize African
Agriculture, Meeting on Support to CAADP Implementation, Rome, 17 September 2003.
90. I am extremely grateful to Michael Wales and Claudio Gregorio of the FAO
Investment Centre Division who let me sit in at a meeting with members of the NEPAD
secretariat in which they sketched this diagrammatic representation of the CAADP
funding strategy.
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The project development phase will involve the melting of various
novel and on-going processes into a "medium term plan" which will in
turn be broken up into a number of "bankable projects." Ideally, the
project development phase, inclusive of the feasibility studies, should be
undertaken by the NEPAD secretariat with the technical collaboration of
specialist international organizations such as the FAO in the case of
agriculture, UNIDO with regard to industrial development and so on.
Once the process of project development is sufficiently ripe, the project
could then be shopped around, again with the NEPAD secretariat as an
intermediary, to possible investors, including the World Bank, the
African Development Bank and regional development banks, the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (WAD), and bilateral
donors such as the European Communities.
Very importantly, the NEPAD architects also agreed to "adopt sound
policies for agricultural and rural development, and committed themselves
to allocating at least 10 percent of national budgetary resources for their
implementation within five years."9' Operationalizing and properly
implementing the commitment to allocate a portion of budgetary
resources into agriculture is bound to be a difficult task for many
reasons. We here examine the possible legal approach to implement
this. The first approach could be to simply provide for it in annual
Parliamentary Appropriations Bills, Budget Law or budget for each
country, as the case may be. A useful example might be Tanzania,
which in its 2003/2004 budget has committed to give "subsidies to
farmers in four bread-basket regions." 92 It is good to remember that a
national budget should not be seen simply as a technical instrument that
sums up how much was received in income and spent in expenditures
but also as an important policy statement by a sitting government. In this
regard, and aside from providing an opportunity for the government to
91. See Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, supra note 85, at
para. 2. In addition, they undertook to engage in consultations at national and regional
levels with civil society organizations and other key stakeholders, including the small-
scale and traditional farmers, private sector, women and youth associations, etc., aimed
at promoting their active participations in all aspects of agricultural and food production;
ensure, through collaborative efforts at the national and regional levels, the preparation
of bankable projects under CAADP for the mobilization of resources for investment in
agricultural growth and rural development.
92. See F. Rwambali, Dar's People-Centred Budget Praised, THE EAST AFRICAN,
June 16 2003, available at http://www.nationaudio.comn/News/EastAfrican/16062003/
Regional/Regional40.html.
present its future intentions and review past performance, it reflects the
fundamental development imperatives of the government, outlines the
government views on fiscal and economic aspirations and sets social and
economic priorities.
One of the ways to ensure that this provision or the commitment of
budgetary allocation is respected is through an external public auditing
process, that is, by opening up the budgetary process to public scrutiny.9
In this way, a sensitized public, broadly aware of the policy to commit
resources into agriculture, could raise objections if such an allocation is
not made in any particular year. This is warranted since the budget is
officially the document that portrays a government's expenditure and
income revenue estimates and reflects its policy priorities and fiscal
targets. However, the content of the budget document usually results
from a careful analysis of government priorities and sometimes sectoral
pressure. Hence periodic exigencies, including seemingly mundane ones
such as presidential re-election interests inevitably come into play, and
Africa is not unique in this sense.
A mere declaration therefore to commit a certain percentage of the
budget for a specific purpose without real guarantees and effort to ensure
that this is actually done could amount to nothing. It is important to
understand that in most countries in Africa, the budget process comprises
three main stages: the budget formulation stage at which the budget plan
is put together almost exclusively by the executive branch of government,
usually the minister for finance or economy; the enactment stage at
which the budget estimates are debated, altered, and approved by the
legislative branch; the execution phase at which the policies of the
budget are carried out by the government. 94 In implementing the Declaration
on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, a close monitoring of all
three phases will be necessary. In this regard, the constitutional
guarantees for further modifications of the budget, particularly in the
second stage where the legislature is expected to debate and suggest
changes, would be crucial. A sound domestic legal framework would be
essential therefore for an effective implementation of the ten percent
commitment, just as it is necessary in general, for an effective and
enduring budget system. In some countries, this legal framework is part
93. For an interesting discussion of this "external auditing process" see Warren
Krafchik, What Role Can Civil Society and Parliament Play in Strengthening the
External Auditing Function?, presented at Towards Auditing Effectiveness (an African
regional workshop organized by the World Bank Institute and held in Ethiopia), May
12-15, 2003, at http://www.internationalbudget.org/auditorgeneral.htm.
94. See generally, Allen Schick, A Contemporary Approach to Public Expenditure
Management, WORLD BANK INSTITUTE, (1998), available at http://www l.worldbank.org/
publicsector/pe/handbooks.htm.
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and parcel of the core legal documents, for instance the constitution or
basic law, or in fact, a dedicated statute often annually revised.
A key goal of such a legal framework, regardless of the form it takes,
should be to incorporate a monitoring system, or perhaps a spending
evaluation system to ensure that the required 10 percent is really set
aside and used as intended. Thus, such a legal framework should ensure
that there is a role for the legislature with specific responsibility being
vested in the Ministry of Agriculture, and for an independent auditing
institution, which could be an independent statutory committee under the
Ministry of Agriculture, to guard against extraneous concerns by the
executive that may work against the sectoral allocation. Further,
legislative room should be created to invoke external monitoring, to a
measured degree, perhaps by an explicit provision that the allocation
will be subject to the NEPAD peer review mechanism.
In general as is certainly the case in most democracies throughout the
world, such a legal framework also establishes the rules and regulations
that guide the budget decision-making process and the management of
government revenue and public expenditure. This is the point where the
10 percent commitment would need to be included. In general the 10
percent rule would fall within the corpus of rules that dictate the scope
of the budget. Such legislative provisions could be extended to cover
sectoral priorities such as the procurement specificities for each
individual agricultural sub-sector including, for instance, rural access
roads, irrigation schemes, and support to agricultural marketing boards
and so on. In general since NEPAD is about ownership of the development
process by African governments, it would be important to simply
establish benchmarks on the allocation of the 10 percent funding and to
cede a reasonable degree of managerial responsibility to the relevant
government officers. The minimum benchmarks could include issues
such as a cap on the portion of the 10 percent funding that could be spent
on salaries for instance.
In most of Africa at the moment, budget transparency and public
participation in the allocation of resources is quite limited, and is almost
exclusively the preserve of the executive and to a lesser extent, the
parliament. In South Africa, classified in a recent study95 as having a
95. See generally, INSTITUTE OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA, BUDGET
TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION: FIVE AFRICAN CASE STUDIES, (Alta F61scher ed.
2002). (A useful summary of the contents of the book is available at http://
www.internationalbudget.org).
"good legal framework" 96 that accords "transparency and participation in
the budget process," 97 there has been substantial improvements in public
availability of information in addition to a "clear framework of accountability
for public resources and delivery." 98 In Kenya and Ghana, the budget
process is based on comprehensive but "outdated legal frameworks
which often conflict with government policy." 99 The budget process in
Kenya does not lend itself to external participation. It is tightly controlled
by the executive given that the Minister for Finance prepares and
presents the budget for parliamentary approval, which has never been
denied. Zambia and Nigeria have "weak legal frameworks and weak
transparency and participation."' 00 In Zambia, the law allows for "virtually
limitless expenditure"' 0'1 with ex post approval and almost no
requirement for release of information to the public. 102 In general however,
there is heightened realization that parliaments and civil society groups
should have a monitoring role in the budget process. This is a positive
development and one that could aid the process of implementation of the
10 percent agricultural investment commitment in the Declaration
issued by African leaders in Maputo. In good faith, governments could
help foster openness in the budgetary openness by making accurate
budget documentation, fiscal policy statements and allocation decisions,
available quickly and widely.
IV. FIRST THE LAW: THE LEGAL BASIS FOR AN INSTITUTIONALLY
SOLID NEPAD
In this part of the paper, our objective is to look at what the legal basis
for a solid NEPAD process and secretariat could be. Contemporary "law
and development" discourse emphasizes the need to bring law to bear in
the struggle for development. NEPAD therefore has to incorporate a
general appeal to technical and legal expertise and ideas on best
practices. As Professor David Kennedy of Harvard Law School notes,
"If development means more than a one time growth spurt-means some
sort of sustained, upward spiral, or some kind of socio-economic
transformation-then one needs an idea about how a political choice will








103. See David Kennedy, Laws and Developments, in CONTEMPLATING COMPLEXITY:
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Amanda Perry & John Hatchards
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choices, particularly in situations involving more than one sovereign
government will inevitably be a daunting and potentially divisive task.
To attempt do so, without any pretense to some kind of legal framework
would seem preposterous. This is what NEPAD as currently constituted,
especially when looked at as a realistically pseudo-independent body in
operation from the African Union, tries to do and it is well nigh
impossible.
NEPAD is the window through which big-time investors are looking
at possible investment projects in Africa. The role of NEPAD in
packaging and marketing these potential projects is essentially that of a
catalytic middleman, a marketing agent. It is a basic marketing strategy
that the marketing agent herself should believe in the product being
marketed. That way, she can inject infectious vigor and enthusiasm
about the good qualities of the product or project that is being marketed.
The agent has to look the part. It would be un-inspiring and difficult to
rely on money market advice from a visibly impecunious stockbroker for
instance. NEPAD will inevitably find itself in this situation. Its internal
decision-making processes should be subject to clear legal procedures.
It should project the image of an agent that is both competent,
trustworthy and that recognizes the certainty and assurances that result
from adherence to basic legal principles. A chaotic NEPAD secretariat and
internal decision-making process would be a disservice to its mandate.
As it is, NEPAD is a marketing agent of a seemingly undesirable
product: much has been written about the standards of respect for the
rule of law in Africa. The most graphic recent example is perhaps
Swaziland, where all the judges in the Court of Appeal resigned last year
because the government was ignoring judgments issued by the court.
For the past one year therefore, the country has been without a court of
last resort. For our purposes, the plight of litigant investors would seem
extremely precarious in this situation. Obviously, the Swazi government
makes nonsense of the wisdom of the late Dr. Ibrahim Shihata, who
advised that "a complement to economic reform is judicial reform and
legal reform. Without effective laws, without effective structures there
may not be investment, there may not be growth. ' °4 This correlation
was graphically captured in Kenya recently when the shares at the
Nairobi Stock Exchange gained dramatically after the government
eds., 2003).
104. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD:
SELECTED ESSAYS AND LECTURES 2 (1995).
purged the judiciary of corrupt judges following a report that cited
almost half of the country's judges for corruption and other unprofessional
practices. 105
In fashioning out an effective institutional set-up for both the NEPAD
secretariat and the independent APRM Secretariat, it is inevitable that
their relationship with the African Union will need to be addressed once
and for all. To begin with, the APRM Secretariat should be independent
of both the general NEPAD secretariat and all other institutions by virtue
of the potentially sensitive assessment work it will be expected to carry
out. It must have a separate staff and budget if its credibility and
efficiency is to be established and maintained. For the moment, the
NEPAD and APRM secretariats operate independently of their parent
body, the African Union, on the basis of a temporal arrangement in
which NEPAD's offices in Midrand operate as AU offices outside of the
AU Addis Ababa headquarters.
10 6
The general perception however remains that NEPAD is a plan for
implementing the AU's objectives. Given the manner in which it has
incorporated and referred to on-going development and integration
processes in the continent and the fact that it is subsumed within the AU,
NEPAD could also be said to be a mandated mechanism for furthering
the goals of the Abuja Treaty of 1991. Since NEPAD is listed as a "special
program" under the AU, the AU Chairperson and the AU Commission
Chairperson are ex-officio Members of the Implementing Committee.
Further, NEPAD is supposed to work closely with and to complement
the AU's Conference on Security, Stability, Development and
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDC).' °7 This is the positive way of looking
105. See Tom Mogusu, Equity Market Reaps from Purge in Judiciary, FINANCIAL
STANDARD, Oct. 28-Nov. 3, 2003, available at http://www.eastandard.net/financial
standard/news/news281003002.htm (last visited on Feb. 17, 2004). According to the
source, the Kenyan "government's decision to push through its long-promised radical
surgery in judiciary is already bearing fruit.... Shares at the Nairobi Stock Exchange
(NSE), that for a long time have only known volatility, are now looking at a bullish
stretch. Analysts say that while the market has been reluctant to buy into the
government's economic recovery story, it has actually been won over by the President's
decision to send home key Members of the judiciary accused of involvement in
corruption... banking stocks have gone up. For a long time they have been dogged by ajudicial system that has simply refused to move. These changes are pushing up the index
indicating that the changes in the judiciary are positive...."
106. See Declaration on the Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's
Development, supra note 15, at para. 9(ii) in which the AU Assembly mandates the
Chairperson of the Commission to "enter into a temporary host agreement with the
government of the Republic of South Africa with the view to providing the NEPAD
Secretariat with a legal status of an AU Office operating outside the African Union
headquarters for a transitional period of three (3) years as from January 2003, or until
such time the relevant structures of the African Union are fully operational, whichever
comes first" (emphasis in original).
107. The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
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at an otherwise problematic framework. We say problematic because
what NEPAD has taken under its mandate lies astride all the AU
Commissions portfolios, ranging from the commissions on peace and
security, political affairs, infrastructure, economic affairs, trade and
industry, rural economy and agriculture. 10 8 In fact, if properly constituted
and adequately staffed, NEPAD's competence could see it function
exactly as, and parallel to the AU Commission. Another issue hinges on
the budget and the legal definition of NEPAD in AU documents. As we
indicated earlier, it seems settled now that NEPAD is a "programme" of
the African Union. 109 Article 20 of the Statute of the Commission of the
African Union lays out the content of the Programme and Budget of the
AU. It states that this shall be prepared by the Commission and be
submitted to the Executive Council through the Permanent Representatives
Committee every two years. Article 20(2) goes on to say that the
Programme and Budget "shall include" among others "the programme of
(CSSDCA) was held in May 1991 by African Heads of State in Kampala, Uganda. The
conference was the initiative of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, in his capacity as
a chairman of OAU at that time, and President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria who was
the Chairman of African Leadership Foundation then. The meeting agreed on a unified
strategy for development in Africa, linking issues of security, stability, development and
cooperation among African States. The CSSDCA is listed as a "special program" under
the AU. For further documentation and implementation reports see http://www.african-
union.org.
108. Statutes of the Commission of the African Union, Assembly of the African
Union, at art. 12, AU Doc. ASS/AU2(I)-d (2002). "The portfolios of the Commission
shall be as follows: The portfolios of the Commission shall be as follows: a) Peace and
Security (Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and Combating Terrorism.. .); b)
Political Affairs (Human Rights, Democracy, Good Governance, Electoral Institutions,
Civil Society Organizations, Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees, Returnees and Internally
Displaced Persons); c) Infrastructure and Energy (Energy, Transport, Communications,
Infrastructure and Tourism.. .); d) Social Affairs (Health, Children, Drug Control,
Population, Migration, Labour and Employment, Sports and Culture.. .); e) Human
Resources, Science and Technology (Education, Information Technology Communication,
Youth, Human Resources, Science and Technology.. .); f) Trade and Industry (Trade,
Industry, Customs and Immigration Matters.. .); g) Rural Economy and Agriculture
(Rural Economy, Agriculture and Food Security, Livestock, Environment, Water and
Natural Resources and Desertification. . .); h) Economic Affairs (Economic Integration,
Monetary Affairs, Private Sector Development, Investment and Resource Mobilization...)."
109. See Preamble to the Declaration on the Implementation of the New
Partnership for Africa's Development, supra note 15. See also Decision on Integration
of NEPAD into the Structures and Processes of the African Union, Executive Council of
the African Union, AU Doc. EX/CL/60 (III), at para. 3 (2003), in which the AU
Executive Council "Reaffirms that NEPAD being an A U programme, the integration of
its Secretariat into the AU Commission should be gradual and should commence after
the Maputo Summit, with a possible duration of three (3) years, or until such a time as
the Structures of the AU become operational, whichever comes first;" (emphasis added).
activities of the Commission" 10 and "the expenses of the Assembly, the
executive Council, the Committees and others Organs of the Union.""'
Does "activities" in this sense include the activities of the NEPAD
Secretariat? Put another way, is NEPAD an "activity" of the AU
Commission? What is the difference in funding priorities, if any, for "a
program" as opposed to "an activity"? The AU funding procedural rules
do not clearly include a reference to NEPAD, in spite of the fact that the
statutes were drawn up when NEPAD was already in existence. And in
fact, the statues do make reference to NEPAD at other points for
instance in Article 3(2)(h). Given its sui generis nature (it is described
in some documents as a "special program") and its high profile nature,
the issue of operational funding of NEPAD will have to be dealt with
conclusively. At the moment, the expectation seems to be that funding
for the NEPAD secretariat will not come from AU budget until such a
time that an amendment to the statues is effected. It does not help
matters when it is stated in another document that AU members are
"encouraged to make voluntary contribution towards the operational




This decision seems inconsistent as it contemplates NEPAD receiving
operational funding from the AU budget without there being a specific
provision for it. The import of the description of NEPAD as a "programme"
therefore has budgetary implications that the NEPAD secretariat may
wish to have clarified.
Since NEPAD is an arm of the AU, all African countries that are
Members of the AU have in effect endorsed its structure, operations and
objectives. This is in reality far from the case on the ground. A few
countries have taken the lead in the initiative, the majority being those in
eastern, southern and western Africa. Northern Africa has largely been a
distant observer of the NEPAD process. For instance, although President
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt is listed as a member of the NEPAD Heads of
State Implementation Committee, he "has never attended a meeting of
that committee.""' 3 Regrettably also, Morocco, another country whose
economic strength would have made it a key player in the NEPAD
process, is not a member of the AU and is, by extension, absent from the
NEPAD process as well. The expansion of the original five-member
steering committee into a 15 member implementation committee, with three
110. Article 20(2) (a) Statute of the Commission of the African Union.
Ill. Article 20(2) (b) Statute of the Commission of the African Union.
112. See Declaration on the Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's
Development, supra note 15, at para. 11.
113. See Ross Herbert, AU Summit: What Happened and What Matters, in E-Africa,
The Electronic Journal of Governance and Innovation, Vol.1 Aug. 2003 at 6-7.
Available at www.wits.ac.za/saiia.
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members from each regional grouping should be seen against this
backdrop. Each region's member states decide which countries will
represent them on the implementation committee, but each member of
the AU is a "member" of NEPAD, at a theoretical level since NEPAD is
not legally constituted to have a membership as such. The APRM on the
other hand is different in this regard. Since it is a voluntary process,
only countries that wish to open up their systems for peer review take
part in the process. Its highest decision making organ is therefore the
Committee of Participating Heads of State and Government, known as
the APR Heads of State Forum." 4 Underneath the APR Forum, would
be the APR Panel of Eminent Persons, who will oversee and ensure the
integrity and credibility of the peer review process." 5  The APRM
Secretariat is the operating organ of call and will provide the
"secretarial, technical, coordinating and administrative support services
for the APRM," ' 16 with individual country teams being set as the peer
review process kicks off."7
Quite unfortunately, NEPAD's current pseudo-independence may not
last long. Its complete integration into the African Union structures
seems to be a matter of priority. In a recent brainstorming meeting at the
AU headquarters, "fresh emphasis was placed on the need to
systematically and, without delay, study the modalities for the smooth
integration of the NEPAD Secretariat into the structure of the
Commission."' 8 And curiously, NEPAD itself welcomes this eventuality
given the remarks by the Executive Head of the NEPAD Secretariat in a
114. See the African Peer Review Mechanism base document (AHG/235
(XXXVIII) Annex 2), approved by the NEPAD Heads of State and Government and
Implementation Committee and endorsed by the African Union (AU) Summit in Durban,
South Africa in July 2002.
115. See NEPAD Secretariat, The African Peer Review Mechanism Organization
and Process, NEPAD/HGSIC-3-2003/APRM/Guideline/O&P (Mar. 9, 2003), available
at http://www.touchtech.biz/nepad/files/documents/48.pdf. See also the African Peer
Review Mechanism base document (AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 2), approved by the
NEPAD Heads of State and Government and Implementation Committee and endorsed
by the African Union (AU) Summit in Durban, South Africa in July 2002.
116. See NEPAD Secretariat, supra note 115, at para. 4.1
117. See the African Peer Review Mechanism base document (AHG/235
(XXXVIII) Annex 2), approved by the NEPAD Heads of State and Government and
Implementation Committee and endorsed by the African Union (AU) Summit in Durban,
South Africa in July 2002.
118. See Press Release, African Union, Press Release No. 089/2003: The
Commission of the African Union Charts a New Vision to Implement Its Mandate, (Oct.
29, 2003), at http://www.african-union.org/home/Welcome.htm
meeting recently concluded in Nairobi. 19 It was proposed that the
Executive Head of NEPAD should report directly to the Chairperson of
the AU Commission, and that the Heads of State Implementation
Committee, NEPAD's highest body, should be re-constructed as a sub-
committee of the AU Assembly.' 20 This will create nothing short of a
disaster in decision-making. If this indeed happens, NEPAD will lapse
into a lackluster undertaking, with decisions on the simplest of issues
having to run the gamut of the AU machinery. A close reading of
Article 3(1) and 3(2)(a)-(z) of the Statute of the Commission of the
African Union, would reveal that the AU Commission is under the direct
authority and "guidance" of the Executive Council. The Executive
Council is a large body comprising all Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
the AU member states,12 which meets usually twice a year "or in
exceptional cases, on such other dates as shall be agreed, at the initiative
of the Commission, in consultation with the Chairperson and Member
States." 22 "Extra-ordinary sessions shall only be convened with the
approval of two-thirds of the Member States,"' 123 something not difficult
to achieve, but cumbersome nevertheless.
Hence, should it be agreed that, and there is every indication that it
will, the NEPAD executive head reports directly to the Chair of the AU
Commission, who himself has to seek guidance from the Executive
Council, the NEPAD decision making process will be an extremely
tenuous one. As suggested, also, let us assume that the Heads of State
Implementation Committee becomes a sub-committee of the AU
Assembly. In effect, the current position of the Chairman of the NEPAD
Steering Committee, held by Professor Wiseman Nkuhlu will have to be
scrapped off since the executive head of the secretariat will be reporting
directly to the AU Commission chairperson. However, a dose of
political reality would suggest that this is a very unlikely eventuality
given the clout and persona of Professor Nkuhlu, and his exemplary
performance thus far as the face of NEPAD.
V. CONCLUSION
NEPAD is the kind of institution that should simply not go wrong.
The consequence of failure would be a disastrous blow to a long-
119. See Mark Agutu, NEPAD Seeks Bond with African Union, DAILY NATION(Nairobi), October 30 2003, available at http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/
30102003/News/News 04.html.
120. See id.
12 1. See Rules of Procedure of the Executive Council 3, Assembly of the African
Union, 1st Sess., AU Doc. ASS/AU/2(I)-b (July 9-10, 2002).
122. Id. at Rule 8.
123. Id. at Rule 12.
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suffering continent. Everything should therefore be done to ensure that
this eventuality does not occur. For NEPAD critics, particularly African
intellectuals, the onus to provide well intentioned and constructive
criticism should be the dividing line between historical relevance and
irrelevance. Collectively, Africa is clearly under-performing in all fields
of human endeavor, and intellectuals have to be careful in explaining
their role as vanguards to such a tattered legacy. Getting the rhetoric
right is easy, and this has been done quite effectively by the NEPAD
architects. Moving beyond that and into a series of concrete plans, and
following through with them will continue to be difficult. However
building an Africa-wide consensus on the structural changes to
NEPAD's functioning will be an important step. In this regard, the
functional independence of the NEPAD secretariat should be retained
and carved into law. Further, NEPAD's mandate needs to be clearly
delimited to avoid creating overly ambitious and unattainable expectations.
In this paper, we have demonstrated that given the obvious interest of
African countries in sourcing FDI, NEPAD's strategy in this regard is
smack in tandem with the collective continental priorities, and could be a
vehicle to push this further. We have also explained that for the simple
reason that Africa is an agrarian continent, the promotion of agricultural
investment under the CAADP process will be crucial to the overall
objective of poverty alleviation. One of the key conclusions to be drawn
is that NEPAD is positively focusing on the long haul, 2015 at the
earliest, and it has a clear action-oriented strategy, whose implementation
has already commenced. For a continent that is usually caught off-guard
and that has then to resort to short-term solutions to its development
problems, this should be a welcome strategy and a brave undertaking.
There is also a tremendous amount of support from South Africa, as the
host government, and the other actively involved countries like Nigeria,
Senegal, Algeria, and more recently, Kenya. Another positive aspect is
that NEPAD has gone all out to establish, consolidate or popularize best
practices in its development programs, including key areas such as
corporate governance and political governance.
Finally, neither the NEPAD secretariat nor the staff has held themselves
out as the panacea to Africa's problems. This is a positive recognition
and that leaves room for wide consultations and technical expertise, and
the building of a broad coalition of goodwill amongst Africa's diverse
population, civil society groups, the diaspora, the international community
and other partners from outside the continent. NEPAD has all the
potential of a real revolution, and as Professor Shadrack Gutto has
remarked, "it is an opportunity to participate and influence the making of
our own history" IN regardless of its imperfections and our different
takes on it.
124. See Shadrack B. 0. Gutto, The Rule of Law, Human and Peoples' Rights and
Compliance/Non Compliance with Regional and International Agreements and
Standards by African States, Prepared for presentation at the African Forum for
Envisioning Africa (April 26-29, 2002), available at http://www.worldsummit2002.org/
texts/ShadrackGutto2.pdf.
